The gap between CENTCOM's order and Trump's word

Let me begin today with a confession: when I put on the table the Kan report that CENTCOM has instructed Israel to prepare for a new military campaign against Iran, I do not know how to hold it together with Trump's words that he 'does not see the need for a new campaign.' Somewhere someone is speaking wrongly, or someone is being heard wrongly. I have nothing in hand as to which it is; so today's piece is not a conclusion, it revolves around a question.

The report is this: Israel's state broadcaster Kan, citing an American source, reported that CENTCOM has issued an instruction to the Israel Defense Forces to prepare to restart the military campaign against Iran. According to Kan, warnings also went out through the same security channels to Israel and the Gulf states that war with Tehran could resume in the near future. The same Kan report stresses that these signals contradict Trump's recent statements that he 'does not see the need for a military campaign.' The background stays in memory: the US and Israel launched the war with Iran on 28 February; in June Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding providing for an immediate ceasefire on all fronts; on the night of 8 July the US resumed large-scale strikes, citing violations of obligations concerning Hormuz. Afterwards the administration had effectively shifted to a line of strangling through sanctions rather than military force. Now there is a signal on the table that this line has been broken, or at least that a second line is running in parallel.

My reading is this: this kind of gap — the operative level saying 'prepare' while the political level says 'no need' — does not always mean a lie. Most of the time a planning order is not an intention but a preparation shelf; something an ally is told to 'keep at hand.' But if the preparation order is at the same time going to the Gulf as a warning, the matter stops being a shelf; it becomes a signal that the market and the capitals read. I may be wrong here; perhaps Kan's source is inflating the weight of the order, perhaps Trump's sentence was said with a 'for today' caveat and I did not hear the caveat. In 2019, watching Iran from Beirut, there was a similar gap: the Pentagon was planning something, the President was saying something else, and a few weeks later the two voices turned into a single voice. That experience convinces me that two voices cannot stay apart for long.

The second report of the same morning is ostensibly another story: the State Department yesterday published a 53-page report; it records that since the Caracas raid in January and Maduro's being brought to New York, more than 12.26 billion dollars in revenue from Venezuelan oil and mineral resources entered US-controlled accounts between 3 January and 30 September 2025. About 99 percent of this money comes from the purchase of crude oil and petroleum products; the identities of about 20 depositors are redacted in the report. Most of the 12 billion dollars distributed was sent to Venezuelan banks to defend the bolivar; 9.4 billion of it to 'legal entities', 2.9 billion to 'individuals'. 169 million dollars has remained in the account. The audit is carried out by KPMG.

The reason I put these two reports on the same table is this: both show, from different points, the relationship between money and power in US foreign policy within the same week. On the Venezuela side the spoils are being accounted for; on the Iran side the shelf for the next campaign is being prepared. But to put the mechanism by its name: I have no evidence that would tie these two to a single doctrine. For today these are separate stories; presenting one as the cause or the consequence of the other does not seem honest to me. I note only this: the Venezuela report coming out this week, the administration timing its message that 'the oil revenue is with us, we are accounting for it' to the same days as a new military uncertainty over Hormuz, may not be a coincidence.

The accounting for the promise I made for yesterday: on Tuesday, 10 November, I said that at the end of the first day in Abu Dhabi no trilateral joint statement or third-round timetable would emerge, only a US-Russia bilateral note would be published, and Ukraine would speak separately. It did not hold, but it did not hold in the direction I expected, rather the opposite: instead of being squeezed into a bilateral note, a framework emerged in which the Europeans would also sit at the table, and Ukraine did not split off. So I was wrong in my expectation that 'Europe would be excluded'; I under-read that shuttle diplomacy was trying to bring Europe in, not to keep it out. I record this.

My partial answer to the question at the opening is this: I believe the two voices cannot stay apart for long, so tomorrow I expect a statement from a Pentagon or White House spokesperson. By the end of the day on Saturday, 14 November, an official statement will come from the US side — the White House, the Pentagon or CENTCOM — either denying the 'prepare for a campaign against Iran' instruction that Kan reported or pulling it into a 'routine planning' framework; if it does not come, I will read that the binding force of Trump's 'no need' sentence is weaker than assumed and that the operative level is walking ahead of the political level.

Notes from the region

Middle East — Kan's CENTCOM report reached the Gulf capitals at the same time; Israel and the Gulf states received warnings through security channels. This quietly raises regional insurance premiums in an autumn when the Hormuz line is being stretched again. My reading: for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi the issue is not whether the campaign will happen, but how far in advance they will be told.

Eurasia — After Kushner and Witkoff's meeting with Putin in Moscow, it was announced that Europe would be brought to the table. Putin said that a European military deployment in post-peace Ukraine would be considered a legitimate target and that the war would restart. So the gain of sitting at the table does not change what will be negotiated at the table; the demand for NATO's withdrawal still stands.

Europe — In Dublin, 47 leaders could not agree on a single representative for Ukraine; the names Kallas and Costa stand out, but national leaders want it to be themselves. Merz said he could block the seven-year EU budget if no contribution is made to Ukraine's financing; the Commission identified a gap of 70 billion euros. Europe has won the right to sit at the table; it has not yet produced the single chair to sit in.

Dollar/TL is 50.32 today; from 49.99 ten days ago to here, with daily steps between zero percent and zero point two percent. This is not a movement but a held breath; the Hormuz tension outside will determine how long this breath lasts.