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Interior report faults suppression policy, understaffing in Colorado firefighter deaths

The Serious Accident Investigation report says the Rifle Helitack crew was sent onto small wilderness starts on a day with extreme fire weather forecast.

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Daniel Reyes
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Unexpected fire behavior, chronic understaffing, a shortage of highly trained employees and a revived policy to quash fires quickly contributed to the deaths of four helitack firefighters in western Colorado in June, a U.S. Department of the Interior report has found.

Emily Barker, Nick Hutcherson and Sydney Watson were killed at the scene; Nathan Matthews sustained burn injuries and died on July 24. A fifth member of the crew survived with burn injuries. The firefighters worked for the U.S. Forest Service and the newly created U.S. Wildland Fire Service as part of an interagency response to the Knowles fire, which merged with others to form the Snyder Fire on the Colorado/Utah border. The Rifle Helitack crew had been dropped in a remote area to work a fire line when strong winds blew the fires in their direction and overtook them.

The Serious Accident Investigation report said decisions on how to fight the Knowles fire were driven by the desire to prevent the spread of cheatgrass, protect sage-grouse habitat and shield a downwind community. Those factors "established an organizational posture to aggressively suppress new starts while small," the report said, and that framing drove the decision to insert helitack firefighters onto small wilderness starts on a day with extreme fire weather conditions forecast.

Multiple lightning fires ignited on June 27 in Colorado's Black Ridge Canyon Wilderness, in extreme drought conditions with winds picking up. Dispatchers simultaneously tracked up to 16 active aircraft, three emerging incidents, multiple new starts, county river evacuations and non-stop media inquiries, and were unable to transmit the mandatory scheduled 1000 Fire Weather Forecast broadcast, the report said.

Incident commanders on the Snyder and Jones fires did not have clear information about the location of firefighters on the Knowles and Gore fires, and no operational role was assigned to continuously map personnel location against the emerging fires' trajectories. A large fire about eight miles to the west of the helitack crew was observed three and a half hours before the entrapment; in less than three hours it ran over complex terrain and reached the five firefighters, who deployed fire shelters because a helicopter was unable to reach them in time.

An aging mobile radio system and software crashes compromised official channels, and overlapping transmissions forced firefighters to use cellphones, the family was told.

Ron and Lisa Hutcherson, Nick's parents, met with fire investigators in Grand Junction on Oct. 26 for a three-hour readout of the report. "Who was watching the bigger picture?" Ron Hutcherson said. Lisa Hutcherson said: "We want answers, and we want accountability."

Timothy Ingalsbee, executive director of the nonprofit Firefighters United for Safety, Ethics and Ecology, traced the problem to the administration's full-suppression policy. "The policy driving this aggressive attack of all fires is an obsolete paradigm," he said.

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